We characterize optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian search-and-matching model where multiple-worker firms satisfy demand in the short run by adjusting hours per worker. Imperfect product market competition and search frictions reduce steady state hours per worker below the efficient level. Bargaining results in a convex 'wage curve' linking wages to hours. Since the steadystate real marginal wage is low, wages respond little to hours. As a result, firms overuse the hours margin at the expense of hiring, which makes hours too volatile. The Ramsey planner uses inflation as an instrument to dampen inefficient hours fluctuations.
Introduction
New Keynesian models with labor market frictions have been extensively used for optimal monetary policy analysis. 1 Deviations from Walrasian wage setting a¤ect in ‡ation through the real marginal costs and thus the monetary transmission mechanism (see Walsh, 2005;  Krause and Lubik, 2007a; and Krause et al., 2008) . Papers inspecting optimal monetary policy in a search-and-matching model usually assume that hours per worker are constant and a …rm is composed of a single worker, so he contributes to the …rm's pro…t through its marginal productivity. In this paper, we characterize optimal policy in a large-…rm setup with two margins of labor, namely employment and hours per employee. Two related forces a¤ecting wages come up in this realistic framework. First, a …rm can hire multiple workers and an additional worker is not productive straight away. Therefore, he contributes to pro…ts by a¤ecting the wage of all other workers, which results in a 'wage externality'. Second, a …rm can adjust the two labor margins, which sheds light on the 'wage curve', i.e. the real wage is a function of the number of hours worked. A form of 'real wage rigidity'emergewhen wages respond little to hours -due to imperfect competition and labor market frictions.
Unlike the typical search-and-matching model, …rms can exploit it by overusing the hours margin when adjusting production. We argue that deviation from price stability might occur in this setup. With its lever on in ‡ation and real marginal costs, the Ramsey planner can a¤ect the real wage and thus the …rm's hours decision.
Once we allow for …rms to have many workers, we move away from the standard oneworker-…rm model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and towards a large-…rm model. Many studies considering labor market frictions in monetary economies focus on one of two labor input margins, either the extensive margin (employment) or the intensive margin (hours).
Ohanian and Ra¤o (2012), however, stress the importance of accounting for both the extensive and the intensive labor input margin. In our model, employment is predetermined, 1 See Thomas (2008) , Faia (2009) , Blanchard and Galí (2010) , Ravenna and Walsh (2012) , for instance. 1 i.e. it takes one period for a newly hired worker to become productive. When faced with a shock, …rms cannot expand the extensive margin of labor on impact, but instead adjust hours in a 'right-to-manage'fashion. We believe that predetermined employment is a reasonable assumption since VAR evidence suggests that, on impact, employment and unemployment respond little (if at all) to demand shocks (see Monacelli et al., 2010, Brueckner and Pappa, 2012 ).
The right-to-manage feature by which …rms choose hours worked unilaterally, coupled with wage bargaining, results in a 'wage curve', i.e. the real wage becomes a function of the number of hours worked. Kuester (2010) shows that a model with such a 'wage channel'
performs well at matching impulse responses in US data. In the presence of the wage curve, instantaneous hiring vs. predetermined employment is not an innocuous model choice.
With instantaneous hiring as in Sunakawa (2013) , the marginal worker generates pro…ts by contributing directly to production. With predetermined employment, an additional worker contributes to current pro…ts by reducing the wage payments to all existing workers, creating a 'wage externality'. An additional worker reduces the number of hours needed to satisfy future demand as …rms shift production from the intensive to the extensive labor margin.
Through the wage curve, the reduction in hours results in a reduction in the real wage.
We assume that producers are monopolistically competitive …rms that face price rigidities as well as search-and-matching frictions in the labor market (see Barnichon, 2010 , Kuester, 2010 and Thomas, 2011 ). Ebell and Haefke (2009) justify the large-…rm assumption under monopolistic competition by arguing that a …rm's size is related to its market power. While the separation of these two frictions in a 'producer-retailer structure', as in Trigari (2006) , is a useful device for many research questions, we argue that optimal policy prescriptions are rather sensitive to this assumption.
Our contribution is to show that our large-…rm model combining the two labor margins gives rise to optimal monetary and …scal policies. We highlight that both the intensive 2 and the extensive labor margins are distorted in the competitive allocation. Hours per employee are ine¢ ciently low because of the combination of imperfect competition in product markets and labor market frictions (wage bargaining coupled with a 'right-to-manage'choice of hours). Hiring is ine¢ cient for two reasons. All things equal, the wage externality implies that …rms tend to over-hire in order to bene…t from the reduction in wages (see Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) . This e¤ect is, however, dominated by the fact that each employee works too few hours, implying that the steady-state value of an additional worker is lower than is e¢ cient. As a result, both hours and employment are suboptimally low at the steady state. We show how a combination of a tax on …rm revenues, a consumption subsidy and a compensating transfer to unemployed home production workers makes the steady state e¢ cient. Under an optimal tax policy mix, ‡uctuations in real marginal costs due to price setting frictions represent the only cyclical distortions. Therefore, strict in ‡ation targeting is optimal and implements the e¢ cient allocation. However, when tax instruments are unavailable and the steady state is distorted, the Ramsey optimal policy deviates from price stability.
Labor inputs distortions at the steady state result in ine¢ cient cyclical ‡uctuations in response to shocks. The wage per worker, set through bilateral bargaining, is an increasing and convex function of hours worked, as captured by the wage curve. The slope of the wage curve (i.e. the real marginal wage) is too low at the steady state due to the hours distortion described above. This implies that, in response to shocks, wages do not rise much for a given increase in hours worked. Firms exploit this endogenous 'real wage rigidity'
by overusing the hours margin, and potentially underusing the employment margin, when responding to changes in demand or technology. Price rigidities give the Ramsey planner a tool to in ‡uence the real marginal wage and thus the tradeo¤ between the intensive and the extensive labor margin. In ‡ation is used as a countercyclical policy instrument (with respect to hours worked) to dampen ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in hours. We show that the magnitude of the deviation of price stability depends on the size of the hours distortion, which in turn is driven by the bargaining power of workers, the disutility cost of hours and the return to hours in production (see also Barnichon, 2012 various aspects of the large-…rm setup, but has so far not provided an optimal monetary policy analysis. 2 Our paper aims to …ll this gap.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the distortions at the steady state and the optimal taxation results. In Section 4, we analyze optimal monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.
Model
Our model features search-and-matching frictions in the labor market and bilateral wage bargaining à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . 3 We adopt the large-…rm version of this model where …rms employ many workers, see Chapter 2 in Pissarides (2000). We allow for variable hours per worker such that labor input can be adjusted along two margins, the extensive margin (employment) and the intensive one (hours per employee). Firms operate under monopolistic competition and face quadratic price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982) . Labor search frictions and goods market imperfections a¤ect the same …rms, as in Barnichon (2010) , Kuester (2010) and Thomas (2011) . 4 Employment is predetermined and …rms adjust hours unilaterally to satisfy demand in the short run, as in the 'right-to-manage' model of e.g. Trigari (2006).
Households
In the representative household or family, a fraction n t of members are employed in the market economy and receive the real wage w it from each …rm i for providing hours of work h it . Each employed family member works for all …rms on the unit interval. The remaining 1 n t family members are unemployed; they are instead engaged in home production. The family maximizes lifetime utility
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, C t denotes consumption, h > 0 captures the weight on hours in labor disutility, while h 0 determines the curvature of labor disutility. There exists an insurance technology guaranteeing complete consumption risk sharing between family members, such that C t denotes consumption enjoyed by a member as well as overall family consumption. As in Ravenna and Walsh (2012) , consumption consists of …nal goods sold in the market and home-produced goods, i.e C t = C m t + (1 n t ) b where b is the productivity of workers in home production.
The family maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to the sequence of budget constraints
where c is a tax on consumption, P t is the price level, B t are one-period nominal bonds that cost 1=R t units of currency in t and pay a safe return of one currency unit in period t + 1.
Consumption expenditure C m t and bond purchases B t are …nanced through wage income by employed members, interest income on bond holdings, real pro…ts D t , lump sum transfers T t , and lump sum transfers to the unemployed T b . Rewriting the household budget constraint in terms of total consumption gives
where an unemployed worker produces (1 + c ) b units of market consumption goods and receives the lump sum transfer
So far, we have described the representative family. Given that all families are identical in equilibrium and their mass is normalized to unity, C t represents household consumption as well as economy-wide consumption. The …rst order conditions for consumption and bonds imply 1 = R t E t f t;t+1 = t+1 g,
is the stochastic discount factor and t = P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate. 6 
Labor Market Search and Matching
where the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers t = v t =u t is a measure of labor market tightness. The job …nding rate is p t = M t =u t = q t t . A constant fraction of matches are destroyed each period, such that
describes the evolution of employment at …rm i. Notice that current hires become productive only in the next period, making employment predetermined.
Wage Determination
Firms bargain with each worker bilaterally over the real wage w it and split the joint surplus according to their respective bargaining weights and (1 ). It can be shown that the bargaining wage satis…es
where v is the per-period cost to the …rm of posting a vacancy, ' is the elasticity of output to hours (de…ned below) and t = 1=[(1 + c ) C t ] is the Lagrange multiplier on the household budget constraint (2) . An employed worker su¤ers the disutility h h
working, which we divide by t to convert utils into consumption goods. His outside option 5 See the online appendix.
is represented by b c .
The …rm's surplus from employing a marginal worker equals the latter's contribution to pro…ts. As in Barnichon (2010) and Thomas (2011) , a …rm sets its price prior to hiring and wage bargaining. Once it has set a price, it adjusts hours unilaterally to satisfy demand at that price. Therefore, …rm revenues are independent of n it and the contribution of the marginal worker to …rm pro…ts is the marginal reduction in the wage bill, (h it =')w
de…ning the real marginal wage, and not his marginal revenue product as in the standard search-and-matching model. The decrease in costs due to an additional hire -through lower average hours and lower wages paid to all workers -is what we call the 'wage externality'and it is discussed in detail below.
By the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, we …nd the following solution to (5),
where we de…ne
The derivative of (6) is the real marginal wage,
where mrs t denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
We impose 1 (1 + h ) =' > 0 in (7) . 6 This implies that { > 0, such that the real marginal wage under bargaining (8) is positively related to hours worked. Furthermore, 6 When computing the steady state numerically, we verify that this condition is satis…ed.
8 under the usual assumption that
> 1, we have that { > 1. 7 If wages were set in a
Walrasian labor market, we would have { = 1 instead. 8 The parameter { captures the distortion imposed by the wage bargaining process. Ceteris paribus, a greater { implies that raising hours worked results in a larger increase in the equilibrium wage. Given
the slope of the wage curve is increasing in the bargaining power of workers, . For a given bargaining power of workers , the parameter { is increasing in the curvature of the disutility of hours worked 1 + h , and decreasing in the returns to hours in production, '. The wage curve is steeper, the higher is the utility cost of hours (1 + h ) relative to the degree of returns to hours, '.
Production
Final output Y t is an aggregate of intermediate goods Y it bundled according to the function
where " is the elasticity of substitution between the individual goods varieties. Given a price P it for each variety i, the corresponding demand function is given
Firms indexed by i 2 (0; 1) use labor to produce intermediate goods under monopolistic competition. Output of an individual …rm Y it is produced according to the following production function,
where A t is a technology index common to all …rms. The parameter ' measures the short-run returns to hours or the elasticity of output to hours. Production is thus linear in employment and (potentially) non-linear in hours per worker h it . The …rm sets a price at the beginning of the period and commits to satisfying demand at that price. Taking into account the …rm's 7 We do not consider as empirically relevant the case where
The e¢ cient wage is derived in the online appendix. 9 production technology (10), its demand constraint is
Since employment is predetermined, the …rm adjusts hours worked in the short run in order to produce the amount of output demanded. More formally, the …rm chooses a price P it , hours worked h it , vacancies v it , and next period's employment n it+1 , to maximize the present discounted stream of future pro…ts,
subject to the law of motion for employment (4), the equilibrium wage (6), and the demand constraint (11) . In the objective function (12), f is a tax on …rm revenues and 0;t = 0;1 1;2 : : : t 1;t . Firm revenues are taxed if f > 0 and subsidized if f < 0. Following Rotemberg (1982) , price changes are subject to quadratic adjustment costs scaled by the parameter p 0. Substituting demand into the …rm's objective function (12), we can write the …rm's optimization problem as a Lagrangian problem,
where s it and ' nt are the Lagrange multipliers on the demand constraint and on the …rm's employment dynamics, respectively. Since all …rms choose the same price, hours, vacancies and future employment level in equilibrium, we drop the i-subscript from here on.
Hours Worked Notice that a worker's marginal product per hour, de…ned as mph t
@(Yt=nt) @ht
, is
10
If ' > 1, we have short run increasing returns to hours, implying @mpht @ht > 0. This means that increasing hours by 1% raises output per worker by more than 1%. As argued by Oi (1962) and Solow (1964) , increasing returns to hours can be rationalized through unobserved variations in factor utilization, such as work intensity, or e¤ort. See also Barnichon (2010 Barnichon ( , 2012 ) and Galí and van Rens (2014).
The …rst order condition for hours worked states that the Lagrange multiplier on the demand constraint s t equals the real marginal wage divided by the marginal product of hours,
Equation (14) describes the …rm's real marginal costs, i.e. the change in the wage bill for a unit increase in output. Since employment is predetermined, …rms increase production to satisfy demand by increasing hours worked. Using more hours has two e¤ects on real marginal costs. On one hand, it increases the real marginal wage w 0 t (h t ), or the cost of one additional worker-hour, provided that { > 0 in (8), and therefore s t . On the other hand, when ' 6 = 1, the marginal productivity of hours also varies with hours worked. Under the standard assumption of decreasing returns to hours (' < 1), mph t falls with hours, raising real marginal costs. Under increasing returns to hours (' > 1), the marginal product of hours mph t instead rises with hours, which reduces s t . Then real marginal costs respond less positively to a rise in hours worked.
The real marginal cost can be seen as the cost of using the hours margin, rather than the employment margin, to adjust output in response to a persistent shock. It is increasing in the slope of the wage curve, w 0 t (h t ), and decreasing in the marginal product of hours, mph t .
Vacancy Posting The …rst order conditions for vacancies and next period's employment together imply
where t is the shadow value of the marginal worker. A …rm posts vacancies until the cost of hiring a worker equals the expected discounted future bene…ts from this extra worker. The costs of hiring a worker are given by the vacancy posting costs, v , multiplied by the average duration of a vacancy, 1=q t . The bene…ts of hiring a worker are his shadow value, it , plus the vacancy posting costs saved in case the employment relationship continues.
In the one-worker-…rm framework with instantaneous hiring, the shadow value of a marginal worker, t , corresponds to his marginal productivity net of his wage. In our setup with large …rms and predetermined employment, the marginal worker reduces future hours worked of all the …rm's employees by shifting production from the intensive to the extensive margin. The reduction in hours in turn reduces the wage determined in the bargaining process. Formally, the shadow value of a marginal worker captures the reduction in the wage bill induced by an additional hire,
On one hand, hiring an additional worker costs the …rm w t . On the other, it allows the …rm to reduce the number of hours, and through (6) the wage payments to, all other workers.
The degree of returns to hours has a direct and an indirect e¤ect on the shadow value.
First, if the degree of returns to hours ' is high, a given reduction in hours reduces output by a larger amount. Then hiring an additional worker and reducing hours is less attractive and the shadow value is lower. Second, there is an indirect e¤ect through the wage externality. If the degree of returns to hours ' is high relative to the utility cost of hours (1 + h ), the wage curve is rather ‡at and raising hours has a smaller e¤ect on the equilibrium wage. Then the shadow value of the marginal worker is lower and hiring is discouraged.
Substituting out the real marginal wage in (16), the shadow value can be expressed as
Price Setting The …rst order condition for prices yields the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
Our speci…cation of price rigidities follows Faia (2009) 
Equilibrium
The government budget constraint equates current income (bond issues and tax revenues) with current expenditure (government consumption, lump-sum transfers, and maturing government bonds),
The costs of posting vacancies and adjusting prices are passed on to households in the form of lower dividends. Aggregate (after-tax) pro…ts are
Combining the aggregated household budget constraint with the government budget constraint (19) and the aggregate pro…t equation (20), we obtain the aggregate accounting identity,
The model is closed with a description of monetary policy.
Model Summary
We condense the decision rules of households and …rms into three equilibrium conditions determining hours (h t ), vacancies (v t ) and real marginal costs (s t ),
The technological constraints determining, respectively, the number of workers (n t+1 ) and consumption (C t ) are given by the evolution of employment and the resource constraint,
(1
Finally, monetary policy pins down a path for in ‡ation ( t ). We are now ready to provide a formal de…nition of equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations fh t ; v t ; n t+1 ; C t g 
Calibration
We calibrate the model parameters as follows. 10 The discount factor in household preferences is set to = 0:99, implying a steady-state annualized real interest rate of 4%. The steady-state output level Y is normalized to unity. Steady-state technology is then set to obtain an unemployment rate of 9:6% in the steady state, which corresponds to the aver- 
Steady-State Distortions and Optimal Tax Policy
In this section, we …rst derive the e¢ cient allocation. Second, we characterize the steadystate distortions to employment and to the number of hours that arise in the competitive equilibrium. Third, we derive the optimal tax policy mix that removes these distortions.
Finally, we analyze the e¤ects of the steady-state distortions on the model dynamics when prices are ‡exible.
E¢ cient Allocation
The social planner problem is to maximize household utility subject to the evolution of aggregate employment, which we regard as a technological constraint, and the resource constraint.
De…nition 2 An e¢ cient allocation is a set of paths fh t ; v t ; n t+1 ; C t g 1 t=0 which maximizes utility (1), subject to the employment dynamics constraint and the resource constraint,
The e¢ cient allocation is characterized by two conditions determining hours and employment. First, it can be shown that the e¢ cient hours choice satis…es
Equation (29) states that the utility cost of providing one additional hour of work must equal its marginal bene…t captured by the marginal product of hours. Second, the e¢ cient choice of employment satis…es
io .
The left hand side of (30) is the net hiring cost, while the right hand side is the e¢ cient shadow value of a marginal worker.
Steady-State Distortions
We show that the competitive steady state is distorted by comparing the decentralized decision rules concerning the choice of hours and employment with the respective e¢ ciency conditions.
Hours Margin Comparing the hours choice in the competitive equilibrium (22) with the e¢ ciency condition (29), we can state the following result.
Result 1 A distortion in the decentralized intensive labor margin arises if
Following Galí et al. (2007), we characterize the distortion in the number of hours worked in terms of a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of hours. This wedge or 'ine¢ ciency gap' is driven by a wage markup and a price markup, representing ine¢ ciencies in labor markets and in product markets, respectively.
First, in the steady state, the real marginal wage (8) is related to the marginal rate of substitution as follows
where w = { can be viewed as a wage markup. In a typical calibration we have
and therefore { > 1, such that the real marginal wage under bargaining is larger than the marginal rate of substitution. This means that wages rise faster with hours than in the e¢ cient case. Recall that { = 1 if wages were set in a Walrasian labor market. The parameter { thus captures the distortion imposed by the bargaining process.
Second, using the …rm's …rst order condition for hours (14), we can relate the real marginal wage to the marginal product of hours as follows,
where p = 1=s represents a price markup. Setting (32) and (33) , we obtain
In the absence of taxes ( would set h t to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3). The associated …rst order condition is that the real marginal wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, w
The wedge introduced by wage bargaining is greater than unity ({ > 1). For a given product market distortion > 1, it is theoretically possible that hours are e¢ cient (s={ = 1), or even too high (s={ > 1). This is the case only if (1 + h ) =' < 1 such that { < 1, which happens if labor disutility does not rise strongly with hours, such that h is close to zero, and there are strongly increasing returns to hours, such that ' is much above 1. We do not consider this case here. (34) is not the only ine¢ ciency. We analyze the employment distortion in more detail below. Second, since in our model the marginal product of hours is increasing in hours worked, the mph-curve is positively sloped in Figure 1 . The real wage is therefore unambiguously too low in the competitive equilibrium.
Trigari (2006) and Sunakawa (2013) show that the 'right-to-manage' assumption, by which …rms choose hours unilaterally, results in a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor. In an alternative setup where both wages and hours are determined through Nash bargaining, this wedge is removed, such that hours are Note: The curves depict the (log) real marginal wage, the (log) marginal product of labor and the (log) marginal rate of substitution as a function of hours. The continuous line displays the real marginal wage implied by the …rm's …rst order condition for hours (33) . The dashed line displays the marginal product of hours (13) . The line with circles displays the real marginal wage determined through bargaining (32) . The dotted line displays the marginal rate of substitution (9) when c = 0 and consumption is e¢ cient.
set e¢ ciently. This is what Trigari (2006) calls 'e¢ cient bargaining'. She considers predetermined employment, but assumes a producer-retailer structure where price rigidities and hiring frictions are located in di¤erent sectors. Sunakawa (2013) considers …rms that face both price rigidities and hiring frictions, but assumes instantaneous hiring. In our model, both features are present: price rigidities and hiring frictions a¤ect the same …rms and employment is predetermined. Therefore, we cannot use e¢ cient bargaining as a benchmark, because a …rm that has set a price needs to be able to adjust total hours in order to satisfy demand at the chosen price. Since employment is predetermined, the only labor margin adjustable in the short run is the number of hours per worker. Under symmetry, the law of motion for employment (4) is n t = (1 ) n t 1 + q t v t , which in steady state becomes n = qv= or
Employment Margin
after substituting out n and q. The Beveridge Curve (35) traces out the number of vacancies v as a function of unemployment u, for a given matching e¢ ciency M 0 and separation rate . Since the e¢ cient allocation is characterized by the same law of motion for employment (4), the Beveridge Curve holds in the competitive and in the e¢ cient allocation.
The competitive job creation condition is derived by combining the vacancy posting condition (15) with the shadow value (17) at the steady state. After several substitutions,
where = [1 (1 ) ] v = ( M 0 ). In the e¢ cient allocation, the steady-state job creation condition is given by
Comparing the job creation condition (36) with its e¢ cient counterpart (37), we can see that there are three channels through which unemployment a¤ects the number of vacancies.
The …rst channel is related to the e¤ect of unemployment on vacancy duration. This is captured by the …rst term on the right hand side of the job creation condition. The third channel is related to the combination of monopolistic competition and search frictions in our large-…rm setup. This is captured by the last term on the right hand side of the job creation condition. A distortion arises if
The inequality captures two opposing e¤ects on hiring. First, because of the hours distortion described above, output per worker is suboptimally low in the competitive equilibrium, Y =n < Y =n . Since hours per worker are too low, an additional worker is less productive and therefore less valuable to the …rm, reducing the …rm's incentives to hire. Therefore, employment is reduced below its e¢ cient level.
Second, in a typical calibration, steady-state real marginal costs are greater than the elasticity of matches to vacancies, s > 1 . Recall that real marginal costs (14) represent 13 This distortion is also present in the model of home production described by Ravenna and Walsh (2012 Intuitively, when the …rm hires a new worker, its other workers have to work fewer hours to produce a given amount of output. The bargained wage falls and this raises the shadow value of a worker and hence the number of vacancies posted. Thus, …rms have an incentive to over-employ workers in order to reduce their bargaining position within the …rm (see Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) . As shown by Ebell and Haefke (2009), this over-hiring externality is reinforced when the degree of competition is low (the price markup is high such that s = 1= is close to 1). The following result summarizes this discussion.
Result 2 A distortion in the extensive labor margin arises when the shadow value of a worker is too low or too high. Two forces work in opposite directions. On the one hand, the monopolistic competition distortion depresses the number of hours per worker, h, and therefore productivity (output per worker, Y/n),
resulting in too low employment. On the other hand, if steady-state real marginal costs are greater than the match elasticity to vacancies,
employment is too high in equilibrium. Figure 2 depicts the Beverige curve, as well as the competitive and the e¢ cient job creation condition (JCC). 14 We keep the steady-state output levels in the competitive and 14 Notice that the competitive Beveridge curve is identical to the e¢ cient one.
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in e¢ cient allocation, Y and Y respectively, constant in this partial equilibrium exercise, and we use the relation n = 1 u. remaining distortion in the shadow value is given by the inequality s > 1 , leading to the over-hiring distortion described above.
Optimal Tax Policy
Under ‡exible prices, the e¢ cient allocation can be implemented through an appropriate tax policy mix. More precisely, the policy maker needs to choose the …scal instruments which remove the hours and employment distortions at the steady state.
De…nition 3 An optimal tax policy is a set { f ; c ; T b }, such that the zero-in ‡ation steady state in the competitive equilibrium coincides with the e¢ cient steady state.
As described above, the intensive margin of labor is distorted when the ine¢ ciency gap is not equal to the gross consumption tax, see (31) . In addition, there are three potential sources of distortion on the extensive margin of labor which can be shown by comparing the decentralized JCC (36) with the e¢ cient JCC (37). In the following, we …rst assume that the standard Hosios condition is satis…ed ( = ), which allows us to derive a simple expression for an optimal mix of revenue taxes, consumption subsidies and transfers to the unemployed, that jointly correct for ine¢ ciencies in vacancy posting and hours. Second, we relax the Hosios assumption and derive the optimal tax policy mix for the general case.
Special Case We assume that the standard Hosios condition is satis…ed ( = ). In this special case, we can show analytically that the remaining distortions in hours and employment can be removed with our tax instruments. To derive the optimal revenue and consumption tax rates, we replace (31) and (38) to obtain:
The optimal …scal policy mix is given by the tax rates f , c and T b which jointly satisfy the two e¢ ciency conditions (41) and (42), as well as b = b c , such that h = h and n = n .
Result 3 Under the standard Hosios condition = , the optimal tax policy mix is given by
First, we focus on the extensive labor margin as described in the …rst e¢ ciency condition (41). Given an optimal consumption tax such that hours worked are e¢ cient (h = h ), e¢ ciency in vacancy posting is restored with an appropriate revenue tax (43). The optimal revenue tax depends on the price markup and on the elasticity of matches to vacancies,
1
. Recall that the large-…rm setup -in isolation -features an over-hiring externality when condition (40) is satis…ed. Firms employ too many workers in order to reduce hours per worker and thus the wage bill through (6). Overhiring in turn generates congestion e¤ects by reducing the probability of other …rms to …nd a worker. Therefore, the optimal revenue tax to be imposed on a monopolistic …rm equals the gross markup adjusted for the congestion externalities it creates.
15 Equation (43) shows that, if there are no matching frictions and therefore no congestion externalities, such that = 0, we have the standard result from the New Keynesian model prescribing an optimal revenue subsidy equal to the gross markup. If instead (1 ) < 1, as is the case in a calibrated search-and-matching model, …rm revenues are instead taxed at the optimum, f > 0.
Second, we turn to the intensive labor margin as described in the second e¢ ciency condition (42). Given an optimal revenue tax such that employment is e¢ cient (n = n ), an appropriate consumption tax can correct the ine¢ ciency in hours worked, such that (42), the optimal consumption tax that removes the hours distortion simpli…es to (44). The optimal consumption tax is negative: at the optimum, market consumption should be subsidized. Recall that the hours distortion is driven by the gap between the real marginal cost, s, and the slope of the wage curve, {, as shown in (31) . The latter corresponds to the deviation from Walrasian wage setting and is driven by
(1 + h ) =' and , see (7) . A high relative disutility cost of hours, (1 + h ) =', or a high worker bargaining power, , shift the real marginal wage curve up for any given number of hours worked, see Figure 1 . The farther the real marginal wage is from the marginal rate of substitution, the greater is the required consumption subsidy, which shifts the marginal rate of substution down, see (9) .
Third, we choose an appropriate lump sum transfer to the unemployed such that we can abstract from the choice between market and home production. To remove the distortionary e¤ect of the consumption tax on vacancy posting, we allow for transfers to unemployed
General Case In the general case where the standard Hosios condition does not hold ( 6 = ), the optimal tax policy mix has no neat analytical form but instead depends on the entire model's steady state and therefore has to be derived numerically. 16 We continue to assume that unemployed workers receive lump-sum transfers T b , such that b = b c . The left panel shows the optimal tax on …rm revenues, f , as a function of the elasticity of matches to unemployment, . The right panel shows the optimal consumption tax, c , as a function of .
For a given price markup, the higher the congestion e¤ects (large ), the larger is the required tax on …rm revenues. Large tax revenues lower steady-state real marginal costs s = 1 f and hence the gap between s and 1 . At the same time, for a given bargaining friction {, lowering steady-state real marginal costs s through (1 f ) increases the ine¢ ciency gap { s , implying that consumption has to be subsidized by more. Therefore, the higher the elasticity , the greater are both the optimal revenue tax and the optimal consumption subsidy.
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E¤ect on Model Dynamics
We now analyze how the steady-state distortions a¤ect the variables'dynamics in a ‡exible-price model by comparing impulse responses in the competitive model with the e¢ cient ones.
Taxes are set to zero, c = f = T b = 0. Two shocks are considered, a technology shock (A t ) and a government spending shock (G t ). The transmission channels of these shocks can be better understood by examining the log-linearized equations driving the two labor margins.
In the competitive allocation, the hours and hiring decisions, (22) and (23), are given in linearized form by:ŝ
wherer t = E t f^ t;t+1 g is the real interest rate and we de…ne $
). A ‡exible-price version of our model is characterized by constant real marginal costs s t = 1= , such thatŝ t = 0. As emphasized by Monacelli et al. (2010) , there are two channels at work in hiring decisions. 17 The …rst is the real interest rate channel: any shock which increases the real interest rater t , e.g. a public spending expansion, reduces the shadow value of an additional worker and, in turn, discourages hiring. The second channel is the marginal value of employment channel which is captured by the second term in (47): the marginal value of a worker depends on his contribution to the wage bill through the reduction in hours per worker. 18 In the e¢ cient allocation, the hours and vacancy posting decisions (29) and (30) are given in linearized form by:Â
The hours decision is identical in the e¢ cient and in the decentralized allocation under ‡exible prices, see (46) (1 ), there are ine¢ cient employment ‡uctuations even under ‡exible prices, owing to the steady-state distortions explained above.
If the former elasticity,
s, is higher than its e¢ cient counterpart,
(1 ), hiring responds too strongly to the marginal value of a worker and therefore to hours worked.
Under which conditions does the competitive allocation feature employment ine¢ ciencies?
As explained above, if distortions (31) and (38) are removed, the gap between the e¢ cient and the competitive steady state disappears, which in turn makes the dynamics identical.
However, the bargaining process implies that there is a wedge between the real marginal cost (s < 1) and the parameter re ‡ecting wage bargaining ({ > 1). 
whereÂ t = ln(A t =A) andĜ t = ln(G t =G). We calibrate a = g = 0:95 and a = g = 0:008, as in Faia (2009) . The model is the same as before, except that we replace the price setting condition (18) with its ‡exible-price counterpart, s t = 1= . A government spending expansion (Ĝ t ) implies an increase in expected future taxes which, through the wealth e¤ect, discourages household consumption and makes workers supply more labor. Hours rise by more than is e¢ cient. This is because the steady-state real marginal wage is too low, see Figure 1 , such that a rise in hours raises the wage and therefore …rms' production costs only by a small amount. Firms exploit this by expanding hours worked by a large amount. As described above, the shadow value of a worker is too sensitive to hours worked in the competitive allocation, such that …rms post too many vacancies and employment rises too much in response to the spending expansion. Consequently, both the extensive and the intensive margins are too volatile compared to the e¢ cient allocation.
An improvement in technology (Â t ) implies that workers have to work fewer hours to produce a given amount of output. The marginal value of a worker increases (driven bŷ A t ), although the rise in productivity is dampened by the reduction in hours. Figure 4 shows that hours drop by more in the competitive allocation than in the e¢ cient allocation.
This reduces the shadow value and hiring by …rms relative to the e¢ cient case, see (47).
In addition, hiring responds by more to hours worked in the competitive allocation than in the e¢ cient allocation. It follows that employment increases by less in the competitive equilibrium than in the e¢ cient allocation.
We show in the next section that the gap between the e¢ cient and the competitive allocation gives room for optimal deviations from price stability.
Optimal Monetary Policy
In the following, we characterize optimal monetary policy when prices are sticky. To this end, we compute the paths that the Ramsey policy maker chooses for the model variables in order to maximize household utility, subject to the decision rules of households and …rms.
A formal de…nition of the Ramsey policy is given next.
De…nition 4
The Ramsey optimal policy is a set of plans for the control variables fh t , v t , n t+1 , C t , s t , t g 1 t=0 that, for a given initial employment level n 0 , maximizes household utility (1) subject to the implementability conditions (22)- (26) . Thomas (2008) shows that in the absence of wage markup ‡uctuations, e.g. in the form of nominal or real wage rigidities, strict in ‡ation targeting is optimal when the steady state is e¢ cient. Since real marginal costs are the only time-varying wedges around an e¢ cient steady state, the optimal monetary policy stabilizes real marginal costs over the cycle. This is true also in our model. Under the optimal tax policy ( f ; c ; T b ), price stability replicates the e¢ cient allocation. However, if taxes are unavailable and the steady state is distorted, price stability is no longer optimal.
We investigate how the optimal policy is a¤ected by steady-state distortions (31) and (38).
To this end, we derive the …rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem and linearize them around the steady state. First, we study the optimal dynamics in response to technology shocks and government spending shocks. Second, we simulate the model under the Ramsey policy and compute the optimal in ‡ation volatility.
The impulse response functions of in ‡ation, real wages, output, hours and employment, under the optimal Ramsey policy and in the competitive allocation, are shown in Figure 5 .
The left and the right panels show the responses to a technology shock and to a spending shock, respectively.
The …gure shows that under the optimal policy, in ‡ation is countercyclical with respect to hours worked. After a spending expansion, real marginal costs (and therefore in ‡ation) need to fall in order to compensate for the ine¢ ciently large rise in hours, see (47). In contrast, a positive technology shock generates an ine¢ ciently large reduction in hours, which has to be o¤set by a rise in in ‡ation. In the next paragraph, we show that the deviation from price stability depends on the size of the two distortions. This …nding di¤ers from Sunakawa (2013) who shows that the Ramsey policy does not deviate from price stability in a search-andmatching model with right-to-manage and instantaneous hiring. With instantaneous hiring, a worker's shadow value depends on his marginal productivity. Here, since employment is predetermined, a worker's shadow value depends instead on the reduction in hours and in the wage paid to all other workers through the bargaining distortion (31). As shown above, hours decrease too much in response to a technology shock at the cost of a small variation in employment. This ine¢ ciency is corrected by modifying real marginal costs and therefore 33 in ‡ation.
We now investigate in more detail what the main drivers of the optimal in ‡ation volatility are. As shown in (31) and (38), the steady-state distortions are re ‡ected by two gaps. First, the gap between real marginal costs s and the intra-…rm bargaining parameter {. Second, the gap between real marginal costs s and the elasticity of matches to vacancies, 1
. We …rst consider the optimal in ‡ation volatility as a function of s. 19 In practice, we compute the volatility for a grid of values for ", the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties.
The real marginal cost is s = (" 1) =". Consider Figure 6 . 19 The volatility is given by the standard deviation of annualized in ‡ation under the Ramsey policy. The upper panel in Figure 6 shows that optimal in ‡ation volatility is 0:18% in our benchmark calibration. 20 A high volatility goes hand in hand with low real marginal costs (i.e. a high price markup, ). All things equal, higher real marginal costs diminish the steadystate hours distortion as s gets closer to {, see (34) . 21 At the same time, the steady-state employment distortion is worsened as s deviates more from 1 , see (40). The deviation from price stability therefore depends on the relative size of these two distortions. We can shut down the hours distortion by imposing an optimal consumption subsidy c = c . Since the only distortion left is the employment distortion, we …nd that volatility of optimal in ‡ation is reduced to 0:09% (not shown).
We now have a closer look at the hours distortion, given by (31) , which depends on the gap between the real marginal cost, s, and the intra-…rm bargaining parameter, {. As mentioned above, a large value of { implies that the wage curve is steep in hours, see (8) . 20 The relative in ‡ation volatility ( = y ) is 0.10. 21 To understand this result, recall that in our benchmark calibration. s = 0:83, { = 3 and 1 = 0:6.
It follows from distortion (31) that the ine¢ ciency gap is large since the level of hours is too low compared to the Walrasian labor market allocation (i.e. { = 1). To con…rm this intuition, the middle and lower panels in Figure 6 display the volatility of optimal in ‡ation as a function of (1 + h )=' and , respectively, the two drivers of the intra-…rm bargaining parameter {. 22 Recall that { is a positive function of (1 + h )='. If the disutility cost of hours is high compared to the returns to hours in production, we are further away from a
Walrasian labor market and the steady-state distortion resulting from bargaining is larger.
Similarly, parameter { is a positive function of the workers'bargaining power . Intuitively, real wages in steady state deviate more from the Walrasian allocation when workers have greater bargaining power. From Figure 1 we see that the real marginal wage is too low, such that wages respond less to hours. Firms exploit this insensitivity of wages by overusing the hours margin in response to shocks, at the expense of the employment margin. Hours become too volatile over the business cycle. This in turn generates optimal in ‡ation volatility. The deviation from price stability depends on parameters a¤ecting the trade-o¤ between the intensive and the extensive margins of labor: the larger is the deviation from Walrasian wage setting, {, the greater is the optimal deviation from price stability.
This result di¤ers from Sunakawa (2013) who shows that, in the absence of real wage rigidities, price stability is optimal in a right-to-manage model with instantaneous hiring.
The reason is that in that setup, real wages and hours replicate the Walrasian allocation.
We show that the intra-…rm bargaining process combined with predetermined employment generates optimal deviations from price stability by generating hours and real wages that di¤er from the Walrasian allocation. 22 In practical terms, we vary ', taking (1 + h ) as given. 36 
Conclusion
We study optimal policy in New Keynesian search-and-matching model where …rms can adjust their workforce as well as hours per worker. Firms operate under monopolistic competition; they set a price and commit to satisfying demand at that price. Since employment is predetermined, …rms adjust hours per worker in a 'right-to-manage' fashion in order to satisfy demand in the short run. The right-to-manage assumption, combined with wage bargaining, results in a convex 'wage curve', such that the real marginal wage is an increasing function of hours per worker. In a large-…rm model, this wage curve generates an externality since a change in the number of hours per worker a¤ects the wage of all other workers.
We show that product market imperfections and labor market frictions combine to reduce steady-state output and hours below their e¢ cient levels. Since the real marginal wage is too low at the steady state, wages respond little to hours worked. Firms exploit this real wage rigidity by overusing the hours margin when adjusting their production level in response to shocks. As a result, hours are too volatile along the business cycle. A policy of strict in ‡ation targeting is suboptimal in this environment. In ‡ation can be used to a¤ect the real wage set through bargaining and dampen ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in hours.
